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The Role of HCI in the Age of AI 
Abstract: This paper examines some of the mystique surrounding AI, including 
the interrelated notions of explainability and complexity, and argues that these 
notions suggest that designing human-centred AI is difficult. It explains how, 
once these are put aside, an HCI perspective can help define interaction between 
AI and users that can enhance rather than substitute one important aspect of 
human life: creativity. Key to developing such creative interactions are 
abstractions and grammars of action and other notions; the paper explores the 
history of these in HCI and how they are to be used in the contemporary 
interaction and design space, in relation to AI. The paper is programmatic rather 
than empirical though its argument uses real-world examples.  




The past few years have shown a society-wide interest in the remarkable developments 
within machine learning and associated techniques that are enabling what has come to 
be called the New AI. This is said to supplement and even substitute human reasoning, 
with its powers being amply demonstrated in the capacity of AI machines to beat 
humans at even the most complex rule-based activities, such as the game of Go. In the 
longer term, AI will be at the heart of self-driving cars, human-less factories and service 
industries ‘populated’ by artificial assistants1. 
                                                 
1 The literature on this is immense and enormously varied. I do not seek to offer a literature 
review of it all but will point towards what seem to be representative contemporary examples 
at appropriate stages of my argument. But for a good introduction to the many points of view 
The benefits that are seen in this are, of course, immense. But so are the 
concerns. If robots can do more work will that mean unemployment for the humans who 
used to be required to do that work, for instance?2  In the long run, what will be the 
effect on human dignity if work is no longer the central currency of identity?3 If robots 
are more efficient, what will be the measures used to judge investment? Will robots 
themselves choose where money should go?4  More philosophically, if machines are 
able to reason more effectively than people, what will be the future of learning and 
further education? Why should society invest in people if machines are better learners?  
Ultimately will it be machines that do science and win Nobel Prizes for doing so?5 
Much of these claims are hyperbole, some are simply overexcited. Many of 
those making the grandest assertions are computer scientists, it is worth noting, and 
while the excitement they feel about the advances of their field is justified, this does not 
mean their claims about the wider implications of this technology are well-judged or 
accurate6. Being able to build a Turing Machine does not necessarily qualify one on 
                                                 
that is not partisan see, Kaplan, J. (2016) Artificial Intelligence. In relation to games like Go,  
see Sadler and Regan, Game Changer (2019). 
2 See for instance, The Glass Cage, Carr (2015). 
3 See Markoff’s Machines of Loving Grace (2015). 
4 See Kaplan’s Humans Need Not Apply (2015). 
5 See Kitano, Artificial Intelligence to Win the Nobel Prize (2016).   
6 See for example Husain’s The Sentient Machine (2017). Husain is a computer scientist who 
not unreasonably wants to make a business out of AI technologies but his claims extend well 
beyond computing. But see also Russell & Norvig’s Artificial Intelligence (2016). It is just a 
textbook but its introduction suggests that AI is the most important thing ever invented. 
moralities7. But by the same token, whilst many other disciplines have explored the 
implications of AI, very few have done so on the basis of careful examination of what 
the technology can actually do - the Turing theoretic models that underscore them. 
Instead, they adopt the excitement exuding from computer science and mix it with their 
own topics and concerns, creating a melange of claims that are often well removed from 
algorithms8. Meanwhile, government and policy makers hear this cacophony and, quite 
rightly, have sought to factor AI into their thinking about the future – even though they 
are all too aware that it is not quite clear what impact the technology will have. Finally, 
the general public is informed on these various issues by journalists who do not always 
investigate the claims in question with great care: tales about a robot-controlled future 
make better copy than one about more efficient production lines. The result of all this is 
that the true impact of AI is unclear, the hyperbole surrounding it is making careful 
policy analysis hard, and the full range of consequences that follow on from what the 
technology will provide remain, in many respects, unexamined. The future of AI, how it 
affects not only how machines function, what those machines can do, and how, in turn, 
this alters their role in society more generally, is largely muddled territory9.  
In this paper, I want to explore what this future might be from a particular view: 
the view from Human Computer Interaction, HCI. This view focuses on how to design, 
                                                 
7 For a criticism of the AI community's understanding of such things as ‘concepts’, fundamental 
to understanding human affairs, see Shanker (1998:185-249). 
8 One philosopher who has sought to be more careful in this regard is Boden (1977, 2016). 
9 This has been a persistent problem. For example, Stanford University sought to bring clarity to 
this space with its AI and Life in 2030 report written in 2015 (published the next year). The 
muddles it cites are very similar to those I list here, four years later.   
evaluate and shape the interaction between computers and humans, and has been at the 
forefront of ensuring that human endeavour has been supplemented by computing, 
rather than replaced. This is because it has been especially effective at designing 
interaction that retains the discretion of the user whilst leveraging the powers of 
computing10.  
HCI has achieved this through developing views on how people act and 
understanding how computers function when architected in particular ways. It is a trade 
that requires, then, both knowledge of the human (and their social practices), and 
knowledge of the digital (the code and the hardware). Its key value, to put it crudely, is 
grasping what can be done when these are brought together. It is a specialist perspective 
that allows researchers to shape what a ‘marriage of purposes’ between person and 
computing can achieve; given as I say, that the goal is always to shape those purposes 
so as to enable user discretion – to enhance their creativity. This is achieved through 
making the computer the resource for this creativity; this makes that creativity greater, 
more astounding. HCI can do this not only in work contexts, but at home, at play and all 
places in between11.  
                                                 
10 There are of course many books in the area but I think the best history on why discretion has 
been so crucial to HCI is Grudin, J. (2017) From Tool to Partner. That HCI can nestle with 
the agenda of AI is clearly a central aspiration of this paper. Some commentators think this is 
not realistic, though. Indeed, some argue that AI and HCI are inimical. See Grudin again: AI 
& HCI: Two fields divided (2009).    
11 There are other perspectives on how to design computer-human systems even within HCI, 
though for the purposes of this paper I will ignore them. A more important distinction is 
between HCI and ergonomics which offers different benefits because it has different goals. 
As it happens the role and status of HCI researchers has been diminished 
recently with AI engineers themselves claiming that many of the problems that HCI can 
solve having been solved (or handled) by such things as ‘natural interaction’ (such as 
speech-based). As a result of such techniques, it is often AI teams that are coming to 
design the interaction between person and machine. Though some of the designs that 
are resulting are innovative, I think in balance this has not resulted in good HCI 
solutions, when by that I mean interfaces and modes of interaction that lead person and 
machine (or machines and devices over networks) to produce creative opportunities for 
the human to achieve new ends. Certainly not in every case, and indeed, in my view, not 
in most cases12. To make these interfaces better requires, I think, HCI. Its unique set of 
                                                 
In the case of ergonomics (or human factors as it sometimes known) the ambition is to make 
the overall person-machine symbiosis as efficient as possible, whatever the role of the 
human. It is not creativity that matters but optimised efficiency.  Of course, in certain 
situations these concerns are quite close – making the use of hybrid methods appropriate. To 
be creative with text, for example, presupposes ease of data entry: the ergonomics of a 
keyboard underscoring the creative affordances of an editing tool. For a third time, Grudin is 
again good on this: see Bridging HCI Communities (2018). 
12 These inadequate interfaces have pedigree going back some years. A canonical example is 
with the Kinect camera, an AI vision system that was meant to enable natural (body) 
interaction but instead forced users to move their bodies in peculiar ways. The expectation 
and disappointment this created was reflected in the high sales of the system at first, the 
collapse of its sales once users realised how constraining the system was. In my view, this 
was a missed opportunity - if the technology had been designed from the outset with its 
affordances being treated as a resource for new, ‘peculiar’ forms of action, new grammars if 
you like, users may have been more delighted in what it could let them do. But HCI 
tools and concerns seem to have been obscured by the excessive claims and excitements 
provoked by AI, though I think they are there to be used when ‘doing AI’. The purpose 
of this paper will be to show why this perspective is useful; how and with what key 
premises. 
The paper will be made up of four main sections.  In the first, I will note and 
explore the scope of claims made about AI – about what is intelligence, how machines 
‘do it’ and so on. As I say, these are at once startling and so encompassing that they can 
make consideration of the HCI aspects of AI seem rather minor. They are also, often, 
rather mystifying – making out that what AI does and how it works so startling that 
everything we know about the relations between the human species and the tools they 
invent needing rethinking; we are left mystified at the prospect. But these are just that: 
mystifications; and, in my view, they need dissolving before one can think seriously not 
just about AI but also about what HCI skills need to be brought to bear to make sure AI 
technologies provide the usable benefits they surely can13. One needs to be aware in 
                                                 
researchers had insufficient role in its development. One reason for this was the mystifying 
language surrounding the technology suggesting that HCI would not be needed: after all, the 
system was ‘able to see’ what the user needed. (See Harper & Mentis, 2013; O’Hara et al, 
2013). But beyond this, and part of the price paid with this language, is the notion that AI 
and HCI are inimical to each other: if AI succeeds, one won’t need HCI. But some, like 
myself, see this as misguided. See also Ren, Rethinking the Relationship between Humans 
and Computers, (2016); see also Ma, Towards Human-Engaged AI, (2018).    
13 That this is so affects all sorts of attempts to explore what AI can do. Some of the better 
studies from, for example, the social perspective have to work their way around these 
mystifications before they can find out what the technology does in the real world and its 
particular of how these mystifications can encourage us to start worrying about how AI 
works and not what an AI application can do for us, the user. A desire to comprehend 
AI draws away from understanding what are the purposes to which AI can be put; and, 
the paradoxical result is that the intelligent ends that AI can lead us to get obscured by 
interest in the mechanics of AI. I will tease this out by inverting the normal critique of 
fictional narratives about artificial intelligence and say, not that they are excessive in 
their claims about what AI can do, but they can serve to remind us that doings with AI 
are more important than the mechanics of AI, or at least should take precedence over the 
mechanics.     
The second will explore a related issue, namely how to get the balance between 
purposes and means right, by exploring some of the claims made about AI that seem 
obvious areas where HCI might have had a role, though currently it seems not to. They 
are the interrelated questions of ‘complexity’ of AI systems and the problem of – or 
need of  – ‘explainability’ partly related to that complexity.  In many of the debates and 
research projects in these areas, HCI tools and techniques have tended to be ignored, the 
kinds of complexities and the kinds of explanations that AI require being thought to 
open up wholly new fields of inquiry and design. What is meant by explanation is said 
to do to with how AI tools are ‘intelligent’ in ways analogous to human intelligence and 
so need to account for their intelligence in a way a person might; they need to explain 
their conduct as a child might when rebuked, for example; how an expert explains to a 
novice, for another14. In the past computer systems were dumb, so to speak, and 
                                                 
consequences when seen from the social view. See Neyland, The Everyday life of an 
Algorithm (2019).       
14 See for example Miller, (2018) Explanation in Artificial Intelligence.    
therefore did not need to explain what they did (or how). I will show, however, that the 
intertwined issues of complexity and explainability have been central to HCI since its 
inception. The way that these issues have been approached by HCI might have been 
different, but the kinds of solutions that HCI has offered are applicable to AI. 
This will lead me to the next section where I will look at some of the new things 
that AI tools can do, both in terms of their functioning, and in terms of the user 
experience they offer. I will be interested in what is called backpropagation and greedy 
algorithms, amongst other things, and illustrate what they label and what their use with 
‘text-based’ interaction might result in, ‘overfitting’, for instance. Here I will show that 
such techniques are not to be thought of as black boxes beyond comprehension15, but 
rather as ones that need to be handled carefully if they are to deliver benefits to users; 
sometimes explainability is required, sometimes not; it only matters when explanation is 
relevant to the user’s purposes. Explanations are never to be thought of as generic, but 
as pertinent, in my view16.  
In my final section, I will say that one of the key directions of HCI research in 
the AI space is for HCI researchers to uncover what are the reasons that new tools can 
offer users, such as facts, understanding, perspectives, and so on. Reasons in this 
                                                 
15 The use of the term ‘black box’ has become something of a mantra in this field, and not 
always in ways that are helpful. I have mentioned Neyland in this regard who writes about 
the mystifying effects of such language. Be that as it may, there are many papers that explore 
what gets defined as black box AI, distinguishing the sets of techniques deployed in any 
type, and the approaches to making those techniques ‘explainable’. See, for instance, 
Guidotti et al, A Survey of Black Box Methods, (2019). 
16 This is a point I take from Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, (1953). 
encompassing sense guide how users might act; given the goal of HCI, they can also 
enable their discretion. This is where the action is with regard to the New AI, in my view 
– in offering new kinds of reasons. But to understand these without getting distracted 
and discombobulated is difficult, as the prior parts of the paper will have shown. So I 
will begin this section with illustrations of the kinds of reasons good search algorithms 
offer users, and how users have come to account for their use of these reasons in certain 
kinds of ways bound up with the kinds of grammars of action that search engines afford. 
I will then say that, as AI tools can come into play in new spaces of human machine 
interaction, the kinds of reasons they offer will need to be conceived of in terms of new 
grammars of action; as I will have explained by then, what these grammars might be 
needs sorting out and developing; they will need iteration, design, testing. And central 
to these are abstractions that act as the intermediary between the functioning of the 
system and the aspirations of the user. There are efforts to develop these, and the 
example I will take is a tool called LIME that abstracts text and image classifiers17. As 
it happens, LIME is far from perfect, as its inventors themselves admit. It could be 
enhanced with more explorations of its design and visual renderings, testing at greater 
depth, and further refinement of its scope and functions. All this could lead to new 
abstractions and even new grammars of action.  For this to happen, though, HCI 
research is required not just in regard to LIME but across the board, in other places 
where AI could enhance human creativity. Though LIME might not be perfect it points 
the way to the kinds of research that needs to be done; the kind that can help create the 
marriage of purposes between user and machine that HCI excels in. In my view, the 
future is HCI, not AI.  
                                                 
17 Ribeiro et al, (2016) ‘Why Should I trust You?’: Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier. 
From Norfolk to Silicon Valley 
One might start any discussion of AI with the question:  what is intelligence? A 
great deal has been written on this topic. But most of this has confined itself to a very 
narrow understanding of what the issues are. I alluded above to the idea that intelligence 
in search might be connected to understanding what some web page says; the kind of 
understanding that comes from reading it. PageRank does not do this, and so, in this 
view, is not intelligent in its operation. 
Let us leave that line of thought aside for the moment. Most commentaries in the 
AI and intelligence debates start somewhere else. They presume, for example, that the 
meaning of intelligence when used in combination with the word artificial points 
towards ways of calculating, though not so much the kinds of calculations that an 
abacus can do, as in the calculating that is entailed when people play tightly ruled 
games – chess, for instance. This leads to research on the most complex game of all, the 
one mentioned at the outset – Go. Such research shows that the calculations are not 
simply based on the summings of an abacus, but weigh different outcomes given 
different choices and use learning sets as a reference to select, also probabilistically, 
ways forward, strategies chosen to succeed in the game. Elaborate statistical techniques 
are used for this process, most often Bayesian, named after the Norfolk vicar who 
invented them in the eighteenth century. New techniques of engineering have resulted in 
state-of-the art computers being able to do these sorts of endeavours, calculative, 
probabilistic, choice-making, in such a fashion that computers win at games when they 
play people – at Go, say. On this basis, some commentators have come to the 
conclusion that many things will be affected. It won’t only be when some games need to 
be played, it will be whenever some rule-governed conduct is being undertaken; and 
there are many such activities. Indeed, what can be thought of as game-like can be quite 
surprising. AI systems can often ‘see’ things in the visual field, for example, and so can 
be used to identify objects, even persons. This happens every time someone goes 
through certain airports, as a case in point. The type of technology, computer vision, 
uses probabilistic techniques to interrogate data it gets from its digital cameras and 
thereby comes up with labels for what objects are, objects which are defined (or 
classified as it is normally put) through various fairly clever statistics that allow 
aggregations of colour to be seen as edges, shapes, forms; as classes. However clever 
these techniques and however startling the power of the computers to label one shape 
over another (and hence one person from another), all they are doing, in effect, is 
treating that task of identification as one that can be calculated in the manner of game-
play. The machines are being tasked, via the code, to function like amazingly 
sophisticated game players, when a game entails subtracting, subdividing and 
combining data sets in ways determined by elaborate, game-like rules related to the task 
of recognition. These presuppose what machines are to look for, how they might do this 
and how they might know when they have seen the things their calculations are 
designed to recognise – adequate distinctions between John, Fred, Harry, Sandra and 
Carolina who are queuing up at the passport gates and being seen by the computer 
system at the same time18. 
Many commentators have started to argue that just as AI machines work this 
way, so must other ‘machines’ – even biological ones. Some have argued, for example, 
                                                 
18 One might note that to see, in this view, is not to know that it is Harry or Sandra or whoever; 
recognition is not familiarity, a cue to say ‘Hello!’; on the contrary, it is to behave like a Go 
player making one play rather than another; there is no interest in what is seen or why it is 
seen. The goal is to win, when in this case, to win is to recognise the right face.   
that mechanisms inside the body are to be thought of as behaving in this sort of way, 
calculatively, probabilistically, with rules guiding their decision-making as in a game. 
When a cell confronts another, in this view, its reaction is determined by probability and 
game-like rules - the cell plays stratagems, so to say. This vision is used to explain how 
‘communication’ between and across cells occurs, and ultimately within any system of 
cells. From this, these commentators come to assert that the human ‘mind’, 
consciousness in particular, emerges; it is the outcome of a vast, intricate system of 
probabilistically calculated stratagems. In the body these calculations are undertaken by 
enzymes and chemical processes whereas with an AI machine these calculations are 
done by logical gates carved in silicon by light; but those who hold this view think of 
both as more or less the same – the machine and the body. The material of the 
‘machine’ in question is irrelevant; ‘doing’ intelligent activities in this way is common 
to one and all. In essence, this is the argument that gets called singularity19. 
Intelligence, consciousness, choice-making; all this have common roots; if there is a 
measure of intelligence it relates to this; the latest computers function this way; the age 
of AI has arrived. We are no different from AI machines, they no different from us20. 
                                                 
19 This was originally formulated by John Van Neumann but has been popularised by Kurzweil 
(2005). But see Stanislaw (1958). 
20 So, from this view, while we might think of ourselves as singular – that is to say you and I 
might like to think of ourselves as such, that our minds are ours and ours alone – in fact, if 
one believes this view, our consciousness is the outcome of millions of little acts, little 
calculations and stratagems at the cellular (and system) level that produces this sense of self. 
Our sense of that self is now seen to be egregious. This is the view that Dennett argued for in 
his Consciousness Explained (1991).   
There is much dispute about this. The dispute is not about whether cells react 
probabilistically, in a rule-governed way. It is whether one can say the same about a 
person calculating in rule-governed ways. Those who don’t hold with the singularity 
argument would say what is meant in each case is not the same. To explain that cells 
behave this way is to account for the outcomes of their behaviour, it is not to say that 
they do, in and of themselves, choose (if one can summarise this view with one word); 
it is to say that their functioning can be thought of as being like that. Whether they 
choose or not is largely irrelevant. One might say it is a way of describing cells that 
accounts for their behaviour. In contrast, when one says a person chooses one is saying 
that they, the person, are aware that they do. In short, they choose to; one cannot say the 
same of cells or the systems they are part of. They choose nothing21.  
From cells to Hollywood via soccer 
This might seem merely a question of words, of conceptual distinctions that seem 
minor. But there are important issues here to do with what we mean by choice, and what 
we mean by the choices that people and machines might make and hence what we mean 
by intelligence. At the current time the accounts of intelligence that seem to dominate 
                                                 
21 This is most eloquently expressed by the physicist, R. Jones, in his (2004) Soft Machines - a 
much better book than Dennett’s in my view, since it explores the consequence of this 
important distinction – the one between description of activities and action that is governed 
by self-awareness.  For those interested in exploring this line of argument, they should go 
back to Anscombe’s Intention (957) which explains how motives distinguish human action. 
In this view, a machine cannot have a motive, though it might have ‘reasons for doing what 
it does’ – such as probalistic reasons. But for an introduction see Harper et al, Choice. (op 
cit).  
are of one particular kind, emphasising, as I say, one particular view about intelligence, 
its rule-like calculations leading to choices. But must we think about intelligence this 
way? Are we narrowing our notions to just one view?  Is the singularity perspective 
making us think less about what intelligence might be rather than more?  
A simple example can help us here. One might say that there are two ways of 
looking at the game of soccer. One looks at the way the muscles of a player functions 
when they play. Another looks at the game itself, at the strategies and skills used to win. 
In my view, those who hold the singularity view are looking at intelligence like those 
who look at soccer and see muscles acting. In my view, though it is true that muscles 
need to flex, to understand soccer is to look at the game, not at muscle movement. It is 
in the game, so to speak, that intelligence is to be found – in how people play it. To see 
it this way, AI notions about intelligence simply don’t help. Indeed, they can make it 
hard to see – they can take you away from what you need to look at. Instead of letting 
one see play, the AI looks at muscles. And one doesn’t look at muscles to find 
intelligence22.  
This is not to say that one cannot explore what intelligence might be with 
reference to the artificial.  Let me take two examples of artificial creatures as presented 
to the cultural imagination, one in a book and the other in a movie. What I will want to 
note is that there are different measures of intelligence applied in each case; and 
moreover, it is not just that the games that are being played are different (if one can put 
it that way), but the ways of accounting for success (or failure) are too. Indeed, one 
                                                 
22 This is of course an argument that derives from the ordinary language philosophers, 
Wittgenstein (op cit) being the most regarded, if not the easiest to read.   
might say that even using the game metaphor does not help in properly grasping the 
problems that the intelligence of these artificial creatures need to attend to. And it is 
these problems that one needs to focus on, not on the mechanics of the intelligence in 
question that I think is important.  
The first artificial being I want to consider is the one imagined by Mary Shelley. 
It is the creature made by Frankenstein – unnamed in the book, being called the 
creature or the monster interchangeably. When she wrote Frankenstein: or The Modern 
Prometheus (1818) she was not thinking of artificial intelligence, not as we know it. 
Nevertheless, she was certainly wondering about how to make a man23, and her interests 
were piqued by the technologies that were advancing at that period of time – in the 
machinery of clocks especially. So it was a kind of artificial intelligence that she had in 
mind. Her starting assumption was that one might be at the cusp of techniques that 
would make the making of a man practical. But she was not writing a theory of how 
man-the-machine might function – in a clock-like way, perhaps. She was writing in 
reference to other things of concern at that time, and her idea of making a novel about 
the manufacture of a man was designed as a vehicle to explore these. Central to her 
concerns were changing attitudes to God. At the time Shelley was writing, at the peak of 
the Romantic Period, the cultural imagination was focused on how the individual person 
was special. What they could do, because of what was in them – their talents, their 
skills, their ‘interior life’ - was more interesting than had been realised before; and 
indeed, altered the relationship to the divine. If, before Rousseau (often said to have 
invented the romantic era), individuals were thought to be constrained by their social 
                                                 
23 At this time, the suffix man was meant to encompass all human kind, though whether that 
assumed all humans were equal is another matter, needless to say. 
roles – as King, say, as Pope, as priest or scholar - ; these, though, were subordinate to 
the providence of God. It was God who gave them these roles, whatever they might be. 
Now, with romanticism, the idea emerged that the individual had powers and capacities 
within that broke the constraints of roles – and all the social conventions that went with 
them including the assumption that God choose a role for one. So great were these 
interior powers that the relationship between the world, God and the individual ought to 
change, so this view held.  A social contract had to be made. It was this that led to 
Rousseau’s The Rights of Man.  These were to be contrasted with what had been taken 
for granted before, namely The Rights of God (as articulated in the Bible). It was man 
that mattered, not man as a focus of the arrangements of God. Shelly was not interested 
in the fate of faith, in God, so much as what ensues given the loss of faith. If power was 
now seen in the individual, what was the relationship between one individual and 
another? And perhaps more importantly, what was the relationship between a person 
and their sense of themselves? If the inner man was special, how did that make a man 
feel? Should they worship themselves? They no longer worshipped God, after all. That 
they might honour themselves seemed outrageous, evidently profane. But how were 
they to react to this newly realised sense of specialness, if not that way?24  
Shelley’s fiction explored this. She proposed that when Frankenstein’s ‘creature’ 
awoke he came to be shocked. We have come to think that it was ‘his’ ugliness that 
upset him. This interpretation derives not from the book, though, but from the Bela 
Legusi Hollywood movies: here the creature is appalled at his looks. As we are, when 
                                                 
24 This is of course a massive simplification of a complex interweaving of ideas and trends; for 
an excellent overview related to the notion of the individual and the self, see Heehs, P. 
(2013) Writing the Self. 
we watch the films. Indeed, we have become all too familiar with this reading of 
Frankenstein. But this is not at all what Shelley writes about. In her story, the creature is 
appalled when he discovers he has been made by another person – it is not vanity about 
his body that matters, it is his pride. The creature asks what rights of Frankenstein were 
reflected in his manufacture and which of his own, the creature’s? What kind of special 
interiority was he endowed with? He asked all this not because he thought the balance 
needed to be right – the balance of his own and Frankenstein’s rights. He was frightened 
that his rights were zero:  after all, what kind of man was made by another? Every man 
and woman is equal and unique was the presumption of the romantic era and hence in 
Shelley’s narrative, and hence this interiority was not something to be made as if with 
putty. And yet, through new technology, here was a ‘man’ made. The creature came to 
decide that he would murderously pursue Frankenstein as revenge for condemning him, 
the creature, to being less than a man by being made by a man. This is the arc of 
Shelley’s wonderful book.  
I won’t say anything more about Frankenstein: or the Modern Prometheus. But 
how very different this view is from how we see human-made, human-like creatures 
today, the machines that also have an artificial form, but perhaps made in different 
ways. As we look in our current cultural landscape, it is emphatically not the shocking 
ugliness that we associate with the artificial; we have moved on from Bella Legusi. For 
one thing, we imagine our technologies are far more sophisticated than those that 
Frankenstein had with his lightning-powered butchery; we can now use the almost 
magical powers of computers to make people. This can ensure that artificial creatures 
can reason better than us, they can be more handsome, too. They are, in a sense, so 
much more than us. They are Ava in Ex Machina written and directed by Alex Garland 
(2014) – ethereal, perfect, glorious. And yet here is the rub: the role Alicia Vikander 
plays (Ava) is not about contentment. She is not opposite to Frankenstein’s creature in 
being beautiful. For she suffers too. But hers is the suffering known as pathos. In Ex 
Machina it is in the discovery by her, acting as the cyborg Ava, that she might not be 
‘real’ that drives the narrative arc. She has been programmed to think she is, but she 
slowly comes to realise this is false. She is not real. She is AI. If Shelley’s monster was 
trapped by his romantic notion of human dignity – no man can make me – then the 
modern creature, in Ex Machina, is trapped by programmers who have not told ‘her’ 
everything. She is being made a fool of by her own code. This humiliation - and our 
sympathy - is driven by her growing self-awareness. Ultimately our sympathy deepens 
when we see her realise that she cannot be truly loved; she is loved only to the extent 
that she looks perfect. What she is within, so to speak, doesn’t matter, it isn’t even 
genuine; it is artificial. What Frankenstein’s monster felt, indignation, righteous anger, 
is, then, not the same as the doubt and crushing insignificance that the cyborg feels in 
Ex Machina. How could any human choose to love Ava if they knew she was human-
made? This is her angst, the angst of a cyborg. 
This seems a long way from HCI and indeed it is. So where am I going? I am 
wanting to highlight the fact that how the creatures in question work, how they function 
is not really salient to the plots. It is what they put their powers of thought to that 
matters. Their intelligence is understood not in terms of how it functions but in terms 
that are external to the mechanics of that. To understand these two narratives requires us 
to focus not on how the creature that Frankenstein made works, nor on how Ava works; 
we need to look at the game(s) they are playing, to pursue my analogy. These games are 
plots, of course and don’t lead to a win or a loss, but they are game-like nonetheless, 
insofar as they involve stratagems. They are to do with, on the one hand, the death of 
God and the powers of the inner human soul that must take up the resulting 
responsibilities; and, on the other, the nature of love and the need for self-esteem that 
would emerge if that love is comprehensive – for the person and not just the body; for 
their entirety and not just for their looks. I am not denying that these concerns are partly 
bound up with the mechanics of the creatures – Ava’s code does not include scripts that 
instruct her that she is a cyborg - but it is the pathos of her predicament that is the centre 
of attention or ought to be.  That is my point; what I am taking away from this 
nineteenth century novel and this contemporary movie is a moral. When we think about 
intelligence, we should ask what we want to do with intelligence more than we ask how 
it functions, what are its mechanics. When we want to understand a soccer game, we 
should look at the play, not at the muscles that enable it. So too with AI.  
The insides of computers  
It seems to me that narratives about AI can sometimes displace sensible 
discussion about what we want those applications to do. We end up thinking about how 
AI works (and to how explain that) instead of exploring what AI might help us do. We 
are offered muscles and explanations about how they work, if you like, and not games 
and their various purposes. As a result, we lose sight of why we might want to play the 
game, of the purposes that would make it worthwhile to play.  
Part of the price paid with this narrowing of vision is, in my view, that terms 
used to describe AI and label related research agendas are themselves muddling, 
confounding our efforts to see. The terms complexity and its correlate, explainability are 
such. When these terms are used one isn’t sure whether we are being asked to think 
about what goes on inside an AI application or what is done with an application25. And, 
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when these are bundled with the term black box, we can then find ourselves beginning 
to panic – though we might not be sure we really need to understand how AI works, this 
very term suggests it is beyond our understanding anyway! My view, as should be clear, 
is that I do not think it always matters – what happens inside a computer. Or rather, I 
think it might well matter when one is doing HCI, when one is designing the interaction 
between a computer system, an AI one say - and a user. But I also think that, often, the 
resulting design is such that understanding of the computer system is no longer 
required. What happens inside can be put aside. I do not mean it becomes invisible, so 
much as it is a matter determined by the interactional goals in question. 
Let me illustrate by turning to what one might say is some basic features of 
about computing, and in particular one dimension of ‘computing’ and what the user 
knows about it. I am interested in what a basic computer, a desktop or a laptop say, does 
with files – presumably an elementary constituent of any computer, basic or otherwise. 
A computer has to handle files, obviously. By handle I mean that a computer has 
a user’s files, so to say, and presumably makes them available for the user as and when 
desired by the user. The computer stores them on their behalf, if you like. But one might 
say that, while from a computer’s point of view (if one can put it so), a file is a label for 
the minimal digital entity that can be ‘persisted’ in its storage system, this isn’t what a 
user sees or understands. For a computer a file is a label for a bundle of data, but what 
that bundle consists in (i.e., what the binary data represent) doesn’t really matter nor is 
it implied in the use of the term ‘file’. From the computer’s view, what to a user is, let 
us say, a love letter, or correspondence from a Bank, are neither of these things; they are 
instead, the same - just bytes stored somewhere. And they are not even necessarily 
stored together, but only such that they can be retrieved (and aggregated if required) 
when asked to. One might add that a basic computer doesn’t only handle files in these 
ways. It also chooses an application for interacting with those data in those files. This 
could be a word processing application like MS-Word, say. It is this combination – data 
and application - that start to look like the thing that user ‘sees’ when they interact with 
a computer. For the user, their files are data-as-seen-through-a-word-processing-
application; it is this that they interact with it - as a thing they read, write, store, 
forward, print. These are of course their love letters or their correspondence from the 
bank; whatever. The long and short of it is that what a file is to the computer is not 
essentially the same as it is to the user. There is asymmetry here. But one might also say 
that the user doesn’t really care what the computer thinks a file is, or where it is stored, 
or how its stored or even the application used to interact with that data; as long as the 
file and the things they can do with are what the user wants. Getting a match to that 
wanting is of course crucial, but if it is provided, it doesn’t matter to the user how 
complicated or simple all that work that delivers the file to them is. It is irrelevant. 
This is enormously consequential but I think it is the consequence of good HCI. 
It was HCI that made the insides – or these aspects of the insides to be more precise -   
irrelevant. These insides weren’t irrelevant when the design was done; they mattered at 
that time. But the output of the design was to make them so. To be irrelevant, the design 
of the interaction with the computer had to result in something being afforded; some 
output of the interaction needed to satisfactorily address a need of the user so that those 
insides didn’t matter or they didn’t start to enquire into when they found themselves 
failing to achieve their ends. There were a number of ways this was achieved; graphical 
design, hardware, systems integration.  But the thing I want to focus on is how this was 
achieved, in part, through an abstraction26. An abstraction is not a way of ‘explaining’ 
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complexity. In this case if files, an abstraction operates at the precise spot where the 
system and the user interact27. It unifies the different sets of tasks I have just described: 
the management of files by the system, access to those files by an interactive application 
and through that, use of those files (and the data) by the user. The abstraction also 
functions in this two-sided way when a user ‘saves’: the system ‘writes’ that data (i.e., 
the elements constituted at an abstract level as ‘a file’) and stores it. The user doesn’t 
see this. They do not see where it is stored, though the abstraction gives an impression 
of this (on the desktop, say, or on some other location)28. 
One could go on. What I am drawing attention to is how interaction with basic 
computers entails the design of procedures where some complexities are hidden and 
modes of interaction foregrounded that turn around what users are thought to want to do 
given what the system in question can do. There might be explanation here, but it is not 
the explanation that some think is needed for AI: explanations for how computing 
works that is comprehensive and right. On the contrary, there is a design here, an 
abstraction in particular that enables the unification of both the doings of the user and 
the computer. This harmonises these doings.  
These doings are not just enabled by the abstraction of course, but they are also 
articulated (or embodied if you prefer) in the symbols on a ‘desktop’ interface, in the 
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28 When seen thus, in terms of what abstractions in Turing Theoretic machines do then it 
becomes clear that much of the social sciences critiques of AI that focus on the distance 
between abstraction and complexity miss the mark. Papers like Selbst et al’s Fairness and 
Abstraction (2018) say more about social studies of science and technology (SST) than they 
do about computing despite the authors’ claim otherwise.     
graphical representations that can be interacted with through a keyboard and mouse; 
through they whole assembly of components. This basic WIMP mode of interaction was 
devised by Xerox HCI researchers years ago – nearly forty years ago29. The abstraction 
I have been focusing on is in regard to files, and in particular text files. There are of 
course other kinds of abstractions. My point is that with these abstractions, with the 
WIMP system it is part of, users could do things; it afforded what might call a grammar 
of action. This term has its roots elsewhere30, not in computer system design, but was 
used by the Xerox researchers themselves to convey the idea that their particular 
designs and abstractions embodied particular meanings, and these actions and meanings 
come together - or afforded – a unit of action. Here it is with bundles of data stored and 
used in and through a particular application on a computer, via its interface so that users 
could do word processing. The Xerox researchers realised that any grammar of action 
needs to privilege certain tasks over other tasks if it is to enable users to get on – to 
avoid the mangling of fitting applications to data, to finding data, assembling it, writing 
and saving it; in short pulling all these complexities together. And they chose document 
creation and layout as the task that users could focus on through their WIMP interface 
on their Star machines. One might note that this was a big call; it meant that incredibly 
expensive and sophisticated computers were to be used to create documents. Up until 
then, documents were created by cheap technologies and lowly paid staff; now, with the 
new Star systems, Xerox gambled that the new creativity their systems enabled with the 
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important exploration of this concept was by Kenneth Burke in his A Grammar of Motives 
(1945). 
written word would be leveraged by senior staff in organizations, one’s whose role 
could justify the investment in the new machines and in learning the new grammar of 
action. CEOs would type in text, exploit the layout tools, delight in the wonders of the 
digitally mediated, organizational word31. Xerox chose this grammar, these doings with 
its revolutionary technology. As it happens, this choice did not make good business for 
Xerox; other, much less sophisticated desktop computers won the race – Apple and its 
MAC; Microsoft and its comparatively neanderthal MS-DOS running PCs. But these 
systems were vastly cheaper and sold because they pointed to what the Xerox Star 
machines could do. They offered hope and rather more than functionality; they afforded 
faltering copies of what might be. The future was made by Xerox and exploited by Bill 
Gates. 
Be that as it may, this grammar of action - focused on the WIMP interface - is 
now a commonplace. New grammars of action have emerged with mobile phones, 
tablets, and of course recent applications, social media platforms. In regard to these, AI 
tools and applications are clearly going to enable new possibilities, new grammars. The 
relations between files shared over social media can be a resource for new ways of 
engaging with files, with metadata about authorship, viewings, and annotations all 
becoming part of what files come to mean. Whereas once files were the basic unit for 
the action between a user and a computer, now, crudely speaking, files with their 
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Newman at PARC. This led to the study of the world’s first organisation to have a complete 
network of WIMP machines: the International Monetary Fund, in Washington DC. See 
Harper, 1998. 
associated metadata are the currency of sociability32. There are lots of ways this 
sociability can be augmented and made startling through AI. For a simple example, the 
relationship between use of a shared file and user identity can be an indicator of other 
possibilities – such as the likelihood that two users of one shared file may find interest 
in some of the other files they individually use. There is a closeness here, a notion of 
‘distance’ that can be used to make social connections33. This is basically the 
‘intelligence’ under the hood in Facebook. No-one seems to think that this needs 
explaining to the user. The mechanics of the processes of measuring distance, 
articulating it on an interface enabled by the grammar of Facebook, in its GUI and in the 
skills that users have come to learn, are not required when they do a post, or make a 
like.  They don’t need to know. The insides of computing in these respects don’t need 
explaining.  They have been designed out of the interaction. 
From complexity to action in the age of AI 
Users have to learn new grammars of action, needless to say; pointing and 
dragging, clicking and saving were all new once, just as liking and posting were, too. 
Leaving aside the history of these changes – certainly interesting in lots of ways – what 
we should remind ourselves of is that when new grammars are beginning to emerge, it 
is not always easy to find out what they are and to design good interaction around them. 
Doing so requires understanding both the user and the technology. HCI needs to look 
two ways if you like, as I said at the beginning.  
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Today, though, this looking is complex.  The technologies at issue are not the 
desktop and its WIMP interface; it is the technology of AI in all sorts of places – yes, in 
the desktop, but also on the network, in the cloud; being used by different companies for 
many different ends, from marketing to transactions monitoring, from logistics to 
customer care34.  So finding out what the grammars of action with AI might be is 
turning out to be hard because it has so many forms.  
But it is not just in the range of technologies that are entailed that is creating 
difficulties.  There are distractions too. AI researchers are often keen to celebrate their 
technology by saying its inner functioning is somehow miraculous, almost beyond 
understanding; a black box. Though it might be ultimately only a question of 
probabilistic game play, quite how the game play in question is engineered in code can 
be opaque, they assert. Terms like deep learning are coined, phrases like Bayesian 
tipping points used and explanations offered that say that what happens inside the AI 
machine is too difficult to comprehend. All told, AI fails the test of ‘intuitive 
understanding’ they and those who believe then assert35. Naturally this can encourage 
the notion that what AI does is beyond comprehension even for experts in the field, HCI 
ones, say, wanting to make AI tractable to human creativity. Instead the impression is 
given that AI is some dark science controlled by cabals in Silicon Valley. If this were 
true, then I would say that doing good HCI with AI would be hard – if not impossible.  
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To say again, to do good design requires the HCI researcher understand both the 
technology and the user. So how does one do that? Can one look both ways – to the AI 
and to the human? Before I get to that, let me pause and reflect on the question of 
understanding AI in the general, and not just for HCI purposes.  
Knowledge of AI, society, law 
I do not want to suggest that questions of correct, ‘epistemic’ understanding of AI 
processes are never required beyond the moment of their devising and their referencing 
in HCI design work. The complexities of AI are not to be dismissed as merely a 
question of description, of words. They are important issues here, language 
notwithstanding. Statistics are always opaque, for example, and so that they produce 
outcomes that are not always expected is absolutely nothing special about AI or its 
processes. That statistical learning – as machine learning processes are called in the 
statistics community - is especially complex in its functioning, and thus almost 
guaranteed to produce outcomes that cannot be easily predicted through ‘back of the 
envelop reasoning’, is also nothing to be startled by. What is perhaps unique to AI is the 
kind of data encompassed in its statistics, not that AI is statistics. Moreover, the things 
that many AI tools are used for are often human activities in the aggregate and how 
these aggregates are used to articulate the single individual is quite rightly an interest to 
people especially of they are the single person highlighted in some instance36.  How 
insurance companies calculate premiums for one person over some other can be one 
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such case. Historically, these processes have always been at the cutting edge of 
statistics; but now, the legislative communities have sought ways of ensuring ever-
greater accountability. Individuals are now entitled to have the way their activities are 
measured and calculated explained to them. These rights are embedded in consumer 
privacy regulations37.  This has not made the AI tools used in insurance explainable, 
though. For one thing, consumers of insurance policies, as a case in point, are only 
allowed to see the processing of data about themselves, and so cannot see how 
comparison with others affected the weighting given to their own case. This can make 
the account they are given almost useless. For another, to understand the statistics in 
some case requires expertise in statistics; that expertise simply does not equate to what 
is called the test of ‘intuitive logic’ – i.e. what some supposed ordinary persons would 
judge as a ‘reasonable logic’.  One would not expect an untrained person to understand 
state of the art astrophysics, but for some reason, in the eyes of legislators, every citizen 
is expected to be able to comprehend machine learning. In effect, their capacity has 
become enshrined as a ‘right’38, as if ability and rights were isomorphic. This is not to 
diminish the importance of accountability, nor indeed, the need to regulate and control 
the use of analytical tools that can deliver – all too often - social inequalities. But it is to 
say that the focus on AI as something extraordinarily difficult (and wonderful at the 
same time) is creating paradoxes and problems. Narratives about AI are creating 
unnecessary inflation of issues.  And as they do so, so they diminish the potential role 
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of, for example, good HCI in the domain. It is to that we now return. 
AI and types of interaction 
One way we can begin to explore what HCI approaches to AI might do is to 
look at how some AI techniques work and might be used in some instances when 
brought alongside understanding of what the user might want to achieve with AI. For 
the purposes of this paper these instances can be real or simply thought experiments, as 
long as they are convincing – likely, as one might say (though we should remind 
ourselves that good HCI often requires ‘research in the wild’).  Let us take the notions 
of backpropagation and relatedly, greedy algorithms – the latter being both the label for 
a process of optimization and a characterization of the consequences of algorithms. 
These are terms that conjure the mystique of AI; these terms are often too the magical 
components that make for black boxes. What do they entail?  
To characterize them simply: backpropagation is in essence a step by step data 
analysis procedure that seeks to uncover patterns in data. The process is sequenced, with 
later processes revisiting outcomes of earlier ones; that is to say that outputs of later 
stages are taken back to propagate in earlier ones. This circular process is done 
iteratively. It often entails breaking up the data into subsets and analysing each set 
independently before bringing all the outcomes together; and iterating in the small 
again. Small data analysis activities can be undertaken in early stages, so to speak, 
before the outputs of these are aggregated and used to drive later stages of 
investigations and the results of these later stages are then returned (as it were) to early 
stages for a second (or more) run-through of the same data.  
Gradually this procedure will begin to optimise on a set of patterns or classes. 
When this optimization starts to occur, the balance of interpretations (classifications) 
may err toward one set over another. As this happens - assuming it does – this then 
leads to another run through of the data analysis task at the segmented, small data set 
level, where the ‘tipping point’ occurring in the data analysis process starts earlier (or 
more rapidly). This can change the resulting classifications in each subset and run 
through, which then might alter the overall balance of classifications. And so on and so 
forth.  
This process of ‘learning’ depends on a reference set or a catalogue of things 
that might be found in the data in question. Reference to this is intrinsic to the 
classifications offered up in each cycle or iteration; various instances might be invoked 
in the iterative process, so at one stage an object X might seem to be identified, but by 
the conclusion, object Y is selected. Often times, though, an object that seems to have 
been identified early on can end up steering the overall process; when this happens the 
algorithm that found that object is sometimes said to ‘greedily’ search for and affirm 
proofs that that object is indeed the one. It overfits as the saying has it.39  
Now I do not want to claim that this is a perfect or accurate account of the 
processes in question; more like a caricature to be sure. But I hope it is good enough to 
grasp how a backpropagating system would work in real contexts – and why such a 
system might produce surprising results in some cases. In the literature, there are very 
many examples of the kinds of surprises this and related sorts of approaches deliver, and 
                                                 
39 As it happens, greedy algorithms are more often associated with decision tree methods, where 
it becomes difficult for the process to return or go back to a prior junction in the tree 
structure of analysis, finding itself stuck in a line of interrogation that it cannot withdraw 
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most of these examples have to do with computer vision systems. Here, objects 
originally recognised in separated segments of data are redefined when all the segments 
are added up and a ‘balance’ made in ways that surprises. And the examples are of cases 
where these selections are wrong, the ‘greedy algorithm process’ choosing the incorrect 
optimisation. A husky dog identified in the first one through in a central segment of an 
image set might be redefined as a wolf when all the segments without a dog-like entity 
are processed and a second  run through occurs; when backpropagation is imposed it is 
judged that snow is seen in these other segments. Wolves live in cold climbs after all. 
And so a wolf it is - the greedy algorithm asserts itself, so to say.40 What should be clear 
is that, in this example, it is not right or wrongs that are being processed by the system 
but simply the additions of probability resulting in a call, a stratagem of interpretation 
given the data. The stratagem is to say (to assume it is) a wolf.  
It seems reasonable to continue treating matters of classification this way; as 
strategic rather more than epistemic.  Rather than think of issues about wrong and right, 
it is better to think in terms of doings and contexts – as an HCI researcher needs to. 
When looking at doings in the real world, people may often treat what they see in a 
similar manner to a greedy algorithm. After all, how easy it is to distinguish a husky 
from a wolf? Experts might be able to, but if one is skiing off-piste, to take one context, 
one doesn’t want to make a mistake. So one makes a choice, a practical one: one treats 
the creature as a wolf. Truth has to do with purposes, I am saying, practical purposes, 
ones to do with safety. More importantly, what I am doing is also justifying the use of 
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an ‘opaque’ process (backpropagation and how this might result in greedy algorithm 
behaviour, a black box scenario if ever there was one, and hence ‘opaque’) by giving a 
plausible situation where the use of this set of AI techniques makes sense – by locating 
them in a grammar of action where that sense is to be found. The grammar appropriate 
when skiing is one particular kind – and so wolves it is. In other situations, though, 
when other doings are at hand, the use of backpropagation, greedy algorithms, 
overfitting, needs careful thought – it might matter; it really might not be a wolf.  
From wolves to text 
One can illustrate this with the role of such techniques in assisting the creation 
of text by a user, when a user wants to create a message in a person-to-person 
communications scenario – via IM or SMS say; even on a social media platform where 
such communications tools are commonplace. In this situation, to put it simply, a user 
might start by typing – ‘entering’ - a word. One might conject that AI systems in this 
setting would be one that uses registers of likelihood to predict what a word would be as 
it is typed in. The AI would ‘offer up’ these likelihoods to the user at the appropriate 
time. Thus the word ‘Whatever’ would be predicted as a likely outcome of typing the 
following letters in sequence by the user ‘w, h, a, t, e.’ The system would then prompt 
the user with a ‘ver’ added to the end of their text, ‘whate’, and offer ‘whatever’ even as 
the user is typing. The user could then accept that assistance by allowing that prompted 
word to slip in as they type.  
Without wanting to say too much about how these systems work, though, what 
one can say is that we are all familiar with the little dances between our fingers and text 
entry tasks that can result when these sorts of combinations between AI and ourselves 
occur. There is a grammar of action here, if you like, one in which AI tools and the 
aspirations of the user nicely fit, they harmonise. There is an abstraction here too, 
insofar as the AI  offers up an insert, a predicted word and not a picture of all the words 
in its engine; the user meanwhile agreeing to act on those pictured offerings by 
accepting or rejecting them at that moment when the object is rendered in the interface – 
the proposed word. The word is the point of abstraction, so to speak, combining the 
operations of the system with the actions of the user. Good interaction design would 
clarify how this process unfolds, without cluttering the screen say, offering alternate 
words with the optimal lingering time, and so on. Whether there is always good design 
in this space is another matter. 
But moving on. These individual word solutions could also become part of a 
more complex AI set of solutions. It could become the first stage of a backpropagation 
process, for example, where the words become instances of a larger pattern – a syntax, a 
sentence. Here, the first set of words offered would be subject to second stage (or even 
more) of analysis, the output of which could create a different set of problems for the 
user, if not the system. In particular, when an iteration of backpropagation occurs and, 
as a phrase begins to appear, as the syntax emerges if you like, so the backpropagation 
process might seek to redefine words that have already been shaped. That is to say, the 
system could reinterpret what might be individual words and hence their spelling 
through reference to an emerging syntax. 
So, for example, as the following phrase might appear (is typed in by the user), 
‘Whatever I sa’, so the system might propose that what is about to be typed is most 
likely to be ‘What I say’.  It might suggest this because ‘what I say’ offers what the 
system thinks is a closer fit to its pattern models than ‘whatever I say’.  Accordingly, 
the system might alter the spelling of ‘whatever’ to ‘what’. Individual words would thus 
be redefined through backpropagation; meaning would be made backwards, so to speak. 
The words, meanwhile, would have been predicted beforehand, ‘forwardly propagated,’ 
if you like. The important point is that the identification of meaning would be a function 
of the aggregation of separated calculations, first this, then that. 
I am not claiming this a precise or accurate description of how text-based 
messaging systems do in fact offer support around syntax structures through AI. Some 
might, others might not. But bear with me – this is a thought experiment. What should 
be clear is that this overall process is fairly straight-forward – the workings of it. This 
doesn’t mean that the experience afforded is straight-forward to the user. Indeed, if this 
is what can happen, then one can imagine how this could be the source of enormous 
vexation to the user. One can imagine, for example, how this might create a greedy 
algorithm-type behaviour where a solution offered to the user fits the optimisation 
model but is not the right solution from the user’s point of view. A user creates words, 
shapes phrases but then a system can come to respell individual words – after they have 
been completed! - through reference to what it thinks is the likely clause being written – 
the syntax. And the result? Just take the imagined case above: instead of a user writing 
‘Whatever I say’, the text that the (hypothetical) messaging app comes to produce is 
‘What I say’. A husky becomes a wolf. 
As I remark, I am not claiming that is these sorts of AI tools that are used in text 
communications platforms, but what one can note is that AI tools are embedded in most 
text messaging platforms and whatever they are, they do end up producing these sorts of 
muddles. They do not provide opportunities for the user to decide about meaning but 
instead decide meaning for the user. It is no wonder that they create vexations. I am not 
making this up. Terms like textese are now commonplace and label the ill-begotten 
product of millions of users attempting to express themselves despite the muddling 
assistance of AI tools. 41 This is not to criticize backpropagation, greedy algorithms or 
AI in general, it is to criticise the design of systems where the grammar of action – the 
sought for, ideal grammar of action - has not been thought-through and hence the right 
role of AI has not been thought-through either. What we see in these imagined examples 
is that the tools can work wonderfully in the production of spelling but not so well in the 
production of meaning. The former task, in that ‘unit of action’, spelling words is well 
supported, but in the larger ‘units of action’ of which these are a part, the task of making 
sentences, it is not. Just why AI tools are so badly deployed in messaging contexts I 
cannot answer, except to say it would appear that the impressive powers of AI tools 
have dazzled developers and venders of messaging apps into thinking that their 
deployment will succeed willy-nilly. There is certainly no evidence of HCI research 
being used and if it has, it should not be lauded. Daily, users are confronted with proof 
that AI needs HCI – or least good HCI.      
Messaging, meaning, purposes 
I have chosen a person-to-person messaging examples since I think one needs to 
distinguish the kind of grammars of action for the behaviour that is sought for - the 
game being played to go back to an earlier simile - and other situations. I am not 
denying that AI tools can provide a resource tout court. I am saying that, in some cases, 
                                                 
41 I am not referring to the new vocabulary created by users, one that is at once playful and 
refined, despite its apparent abuse of good grammar. See Harper, et al (2005). I am thinking 
of the anacoluthia and plain loss of sense that users struggle with when interacting with their 
SMS tools, struggles they laugh about and mock. Saying wolf when you meant husky is but 
the least of their troubles. The analogies with AI translation tools are obvious, but there at 
least the AI provides plausible meaning. With messaging, meaning is often lost altogether.   
what is required are not explanation of the complex ways that, for instance, the AI 
techniques deployed work, but rather abstractions that cohere both the user and the 
application in ways that lets them work hand in hand; that lets them get on with what 
they want to do. In these examples, the task has been making meaning with words42. But 
what about other tasks? If ‘meaning making’ in person to person communication is one 
kind of grammar, then a very different kind of activity is seeing meaningful objects in a 
visual field. To guess something is a wolf can be a reasonable thing to do in some 
situations we have suggested; and how a greedy algorithm-type process supports this 
might be assisting of the user and their needs. I am saying that, in the case of 
messaging, backpropagation and greedy algorithms may not be helpful, pushing the role 
of assistance one step too far; but elsewhere, in other situations, it might have a role. To 
determine this, though, requires both understanding of what a user is about and what a 
technology can afford when deployed by the user given those doings. Part of the 
background to my arguments about the need to understand what AI tools do alongside 
what a user wants to do is that I want to contend with the notion that AI tools are so 
opaque that they cannot be fathomed. But I think that they need to be fathomed to make 
good HCI. I think the above sketch of how some AI tools works shows how one can 
leverage such understanding, though I am not claiming my account is accurate. It is the 
need to understand that is my concern. With this understanding one can see misfits, but 
one can also begin to see new possibilities.  
Grammars about reasons 
In light of these examples one might say that a key direction of current HCI 
                                                 
42I alluded to some of these issues many years ago. See Texture (2010). 
research in the AI space is uncovering and clarifying what AI-enabled reasons can 
allow; what new user intentions can be achieved with the reasons AI affords? A reason 
can be many things, needless to say, embedded in particular acts, in what I am calling 
grammars of action. With AI one can learn spelling, for example, and thus a language 
(to continue the example from above) but to use language ‘on the fly’ to express oneself 
is another grammar altogether, and it might not be helpful for AI to offer ‘alternative’ 
spellings or syntax. The former kind of reason is useful, the latter less so. As I have 
intimated, in person-to-person communication, it is oneself that needs to express; the 
reasons for our choice in that expression should be our own, not a proxy’s.  
The context of search offers other kinds of reason too. Here users have come to 
account for these reasons, reflecting, perhaps, a subtle awareness of the grammars these 
are part of. The PageRank algorithm doesn’t offer understanding of content of the 
web43. It is a ‘frequency model’ that, as it were, offers ‘reasons’ that justify the use of a 
web page. PageRank, put simply, counts the traffic between sites - between pages – and 
gradually comes up with a method of weighting significance given that traffic; the 
variation in this weighting is then used to triage possible targets to offer to a user on the 
SERP – the search enquiry results page. The most weight, crudely speaking, or rather 
the most ‘weighty’ connections, are used to select pages out of the search engine index 
in some kind of order, a prioritised list. This is what ‘googling’ means as a reason. This 
is not an intelligent reason, if by that some understanding of the content is implied. I 
                                                 
43 It is worth noting that when the algorithm was patented it was not labelled AI; it was simply 
described as a technique. The current fashion for AI has meant that today it is often renamed 
as AI; the parent company of Google, Alphabet, is rather fond of saying all it does is ‘AI’. 
For them, AI is ABC, so to speak. 
think that is what most users would imagine the word intelligence means here. 
Nevertheless, PageRank (as a verb) is reason enough to act.  And, indeed, people 
recognise this in the way they talk about using search: they say they ‘googled 
something’. They do not say that they have undertaken a vast, comprehensive search, 
‘as a scientist might’. To google is a short-hand for what google itself does, namely 
short-hand techniques that are mostly good enough for what people are doing on the 
web – looking for something, buying something, searching for holidays to choose. They 
are not doing science. 
So what happens when one is doing science? Google itself offers a scholarly 
version of its search which is essentially nothing more than a different index: the google 
crawlers have been through academic content on line, and not on web pages (though 
often these are interchangeable). It searches different stuff, if you like, but uses the same 
techniques, including PageRank, to triage and select targets to offer the user. One would 
imagine that even if they are seeking scientific reasons, scientists themselves would still 
find this procedure useful, offering ‘reason enough’ to get on. This is in large part 
because of the sheer scale of the ‘scientific record’ – the papers that scientists produce, 
to put it simply. Take the field of genomics:  in 1995, there were 5 papers on ‘genome 
wide association studies’, 141 in 2005, and an incredible 3,633 papers in 2015.  
Google can help here but does it help enough? Do scientists want more reasons, 
better ones, AI enabled ones, say?  I think they do, but more work is required. I have 
remarked on how some of the latest AI tools function; backpropagation, for example. 
There are many other tools that one might want to apply to the scientific record. One 
might want to search through text to identify similarities between papers on the basis of 
phrases used or names cited; even the tone of a paper if one uses sentiment analyses. 
There are many techniques and procedures, even if they all start with the same material: 
‘text’. Text is not the only thing a scientist might want to examine, of course; they 
might want to examine images, visual records of one thing or another. Here too there 
are numerous models, techniques and procedures; here too the jargon for all these is a 
kind of argot, distinguishing those on the inside of the tribe (the AI tribe) from those on 
the outside, who don’t understand. As should be clear by now, I think one should 
disregard the powers of this argot and its divisiveness. 
Nevertheless, there are those who are seeing beyond these traps and seeking 
ways of offering up AI tools in the text and visual data fields in ways that points 
towards grammars of action. The researchers I have in mind look at the space here from 
both the systems and the user’s point of view. And, as they look in this way, so they do 
not think that the complexity of AI tools needs explaining except insofar as this pertains 
to what the user needs. What they find is that the user looks for trust in relation to the 
AI systems.  
The trust here is of at least two basic types. The first is to do with whether one 
can trust the tools to do a good job at what they are supposed to do. That is to say, given 
a training set, does the application deliver the right matches to that set? This is, if you 
like, the engineers’ problem of wanting to make sure that the technology they are 
building does what they want it to. Ribeiro et al (2016) argue that measures of this can 
be afforded by making visible instances of the examples used in the data trawl (what 
can be called the ‘local set’) against examples from the training set. The engineers can 
make an evaluation by a shown comparison. Of course, this begs the question of which 
examples to compare. The interesting insight that Ribeiro et al provide is to use 
probabilistic techniques to select these; to use AI to allow humans to judge AI. In 
addition to this, they select the level of detail that is offered in the examples - the point 
of optimisation if you like – as a function of the time taken to examine them (by an 
engineer). Their claim is that just as there is an optimum between correct outcome and 
speed of outcome inside AI systems (with one possible problem being greedy algorithm 
behaviours when this is not correctly set), so there is a similar need to balance speed 
with accuracy when user’s test machines. Ribeiro et al determine this in a fairly simple 
way, and evaluate the outcomes of their model in laboratory settings, asking what the 
users feel about the balance – good or bad, too shallow or too deep, too long or too 
quick. In my view, Ribeiro et al are asking essentially the right questions, but I think the 
answers they seek would be better if based on real contexts of decision-making. Their 
research uses hypothesised scenarios, and these are experimented on in a university 
computer science dept. The ecological validity of all this seems fairly weak. I would go 
stronger than that and say that experiments are especially unsuited to answering the 
particular questions Ribeiro et al ask; fieldwork is required. In this case, this would be 
in the engineering sites where visual and text classifiers are being productised. But I 
don’t want to rebuke Ribeiro and his colleagues; they are pointing the way.    
The second type of trust that Ribeiro et al define is when people want to use the 
system to make decisions, to act with. This is not a question of whether a system does 
what it is supposed to, but whether the user can trust in the kind of data the system uses 
as its reference point given the different, new data used in the task they have at hand. 
Here questions have to do with whether the learning sets are relevant to the field that the 
user is inquiring in to. If a system is offering matches for quadrupeds, are the animals in 
question cows or dogs? And if dogs, does the system distinguish between types of 
dogs? Could it tell the difference between a husky and a wolf? And if it can, does it do 
so on the basis of the features of the creature or the setting in which the creature is 
‘seen’? Again, the solution Ribeiro et al suggest is offering representative examples of 
the learning sets against the examples of the data being examined; again they call the 
latter ‘local’. 
In both cases of designing for (to give) trust Ribeiro et al offer what they call 
abstractions -; abstractions that show themselves in a visual display on a desktop but 
articulating underneath a quite complex set of operations; but all told, making a single 
point between what the technology is doing and what the user is doing. Their 
achievement is, thus, very analogous to what the Xerox researchers invented all those 
years ago. As it happens, these abstractions, in LIME on the one hand, and the other, in 
SP-LIME (the oddity of these names need not detain us here) are far from perfect, as 
Ribeiro et al admit. More explorations of their design and visual renderings could be 
undertaken and these might afford more finesse in both the rendering and in the 
evocativeness of the iconography chosen in the visualisations. More testing and at 
greater, more ‘naturalistic’ enquiries into the context could be undertaken too, of course. 
I do not want to explore what these suggestions might entail in any detail44 but do want 
to note that Why should I trust you? is rare in the current literature; a paper by 
researchers who don’t seem intoxicated by their own technologies and are instead 
interested in thinking about what those technologies could be put to. They inquire 
seriously in to this, and focus on two well-known areas: text and image classifiers. They 
combine their knowledge of tools for these with knowledge about what users might do 
                                                 
44 The question of how one might enquire into the real world, into natural action for want of a 
phrase, has been a major concern in HCI since the turn to the social, with the emergence of 
CSCW and similar (See Randall et al, 2007). It is certainly something I have spent much 
time on, a key concern in my research being to distinguish such research in the wild for the 
purposes of HCI and doing so for social scientific reasons, for anthropology or sociology. 
These purposes are not the same and should not be muddled.  See Harper et al, (2005).   
with these technologies. The intersection of this produces the interaction design. This is 
HCI in my view. 
Conclusion 
Classifiers are to be found in all sorts of places, classifying all sorts of different 
phenomena: from classes in operations management – think of Amazon’s basic task; 
through to pricing models given market velocities – think of airline ticketing; through to 
media consumption and the edges on graphs that suggest advertising opportunities – 
think of social media platforms. The role of classifiers is also part of amalgams of 
different tools and systems. AI never works alone, even if it seems the most 
conspicuous component of the computer systems people use. Irrespective of that, the 
places in which AI can have role are immense and diverse. My thesis has been that to 
understand what these roles might be, to understand what the game in question is (to 
return to my analogy), requires, I think, not just understanding of AI but understanding 
of users too. It requires aswell methods for seeing how they might harmonise (or be 
harmonised). Ribeiro, Singh and Guestrin offer some ways in which this can be 
achieved. But from my reading of the literature – my limited reading of an immense 
literature so my understanding might be mistaken – their paper is the exception rather 
than the rule. It proves that AI needs more HCI than one currently finds. The limitations 
of LIME and SP-LIME point the way to the kinds of research that needs to be done, the 
kind that helps create the marriage of purposes between user and machine that HCI 
excels in; but as I look around, I do not see enough.  
I have explored some of the reasons for this – the mystique surrounding AI for 
example. It might also be because of other reasons – HCI researchers have gotten very 
interested in the social contexts in which systems find themselves, as a case in point, 
and this has perhaps led them away from ensuring their focus combines insights in to 
how systems work with insights into user activities. HCI might have become too 
concerned with use in new places at the very time when a revolutionary technology is 
altering the basis of the computing. The ‘turn to the social’ is emblematic of this.  
Now while I acknowledge the benefits if this turn, one might pause and look at 
the current crop of textbooks in HCI and see that there is very little indeed about how 
systems work in these books. The emphasis is on contexts, not technology. But this 
focus is, it seems to me, unanchored without understanding of how technology works. I 
have argued that some knowledge of computing is required to enable affective 
exploration of what new things users can do with technology, and given the possibilities 
that AI affords, it is with AI that HCI researchers need to get to grips. So these 
textbooks need more on the insides of computers, especially AI systems and tools.  
The purpose in this paper has been to offer some illustrations of the thinking that 
can result from this combined view and in particular what can be done with HCI 
through having some grasp of how procedures within AI systems work. Whether I have 
done a good job at that, or whether more care is needed in this getting to grips with AI 
and being creative with HCI are topics for future papers to ask. Doubtless they will 
improve upon my own.  
Looking at the present, though, what I am saying is that HCI might have begun 
to take the insides of computers too much for granted. I am not offering an analysis of 
why that might be the case. I am just offering some possibilities for ways forward and 
away from that situation. What I do know is that the future is not AI; it can only be an 
AI enabled through HCI. But I also know that HCI researchers need to stand up and 
take on that labour. They need to engage with their own grammar of action if you like, 
they need to understand what AI can do and see what it can let users do through some 
kind of collaboration, a joint working that can allow new things to be achieved. Only 
then can they make the future. But I do think it is there to be made. And if they are 
willing, it will thus be HCI researchers who will help make that future a creative one, a 
future where the artificial augments what people want to do rather than substitutes it.  
The future is HCI, not AI.    
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